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ANNEX "I"

ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL

OF

YUGOSLAVIA

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ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL

OF

YUGOSLAVIA

BASIC FACTORS

I. CHARACTER OF THE NATION

1. Civil Factors

a. Government

(1) Present Structure and Trends - The Yugoslav Government is a coalition of parties known as the "People's Front" and dominated by the Communist Party. The Communists exercise a dictatorship through control of all organs of government, including security and armed forces.

(a) Foreign Policy - Yugoslav foreign policy is concerned principally with establishing the nation's position as a Communist state independent of the U.S.S.R. and with developing contacts with the West to assist it in that goal. To this end Yugoslavia has sought and obtained economic aid from the West and is using the United Nations to protect its position.

(b) Domestic Policy - The Government's basic domestic policy is social reform along Communist lines and elimination of sectionalism to develop a strong, unified nation. Since the rift with Moscow, however, there has been a considerable slowing down of agricultural collectivization and a partial abandonment of the nationalization of industry. Currently, the Government is largely preoccupied with measures to cope with serious economic difficulties and to insure security against sabotage, espionage, insurrection, and other threats from internal or external sources.

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(c) Capability to Pursue Above Policies - The Government is believed capable of pursuing its policies if substantial economic aid continues from the West.

(d) Orientation - The Government professes to be opposed to all types of "imperialism", referring to the foreign policies of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. It also claims strong opposition to aggression and is aligning itself more with the Western powers in the U.N. However, Yugoslavia at present has no positive foreign orientation but will continue to seek Western aid in resisting the Soviets while making the smallest possible commitment to the West.

(2) Stability of the Regime in Power - The Communist Party, the Army, and the security forces are considered to be loyal to the Government and capable of containing internal resistance. The Government is thus believed to be stable at present.

b. People

(1) Quantity - The population of Yugoslavia, 15,957,000, includes 4,311,000 males of military age (15 to 49 years old), with an additional 650,000 between the ages of 50 and 64. There are slightly more women than men in each of the above age groups.

(2) National Morale - General morale appears to be fair at present, despite adverse economic conditions. The peasants are firmly opposed to collectivization. The previous relatively high morale among industrial workers and youth has suffered as a result of the 1950 drought. The people are believed to be more dissatisfied than at any time since the Tito-Cominform break in June 1948.

(3) Susceptibility to Subversion - The Yugoslav people have an outstanding record of continuing resistance against any oppressive regime, including today both the Tito regime and the Soviet Union. A substantial proportion of the local Communists are at heart nationalists, and a majority of the population supports them against Moscow. Conditions favor organization, with Western aid for extensive sabotage and guerrilla

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armed resistance on a major scale against any reassertion of Moscow hegemony or actual Soviet occupation.

c. Scientific Development That May Affect Military Action

(1) Biological Warfare (BW) and Chemical Warfare (CW) - Yugoslavia is not known definitely to be engaged in BW research and development, although there have been reports of research activities that may be associated with BW. The investigations, if any, are probably of an exploratory nature and not extensive. There are facilities and scientific personnel available for limited research in this field. The Yugoslav Government could probably develop limited capabilities for the use of BW in the next few years. There is no information available on CW research and development activities in Yugoslavia for offensive or defensive materials and equipment. There is some evidence that the Yugoslav Army has several standard CW agents available for limited offensive use; however, it probably has none of the nerve gases. It is believed to have World War II defensive equipment available for the troops. It appears that some of the materials and equipment have been obtained from the Soviets and from captured German stocks.

(2) Atomic Energy - No potential

(3) Electronics - At present Yugoslavia is unable to enhance its military potential by any application of its newly-created electronics industry.

2. Logistical Factors

a. Strategic Terrain Factors

(1) Strategic Location - Yugoslavia, the size of Ohio and Pennsylvania combined, occupies long segments of routes connecting the middle Danube plain with the Aegean Sea and Istanbul. Military control of the area will provide air bases for operations against the central Mediterranean area or against most of central and eastern Europe. Yugoslavia is important to any Balkan defense system.

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(2) Terrain - Almost two-thirds of the country is mountainous. There is an extensive lowland, a part of the middle Danube plain, in the north-central part, which is the country's only large area affording easy movement for large bodies of troops. The greatly dissected Dinaric mountains, averaging 3,000 feet in elevation, parallel the coast and descend gradually toward Greece. Thus, relief features restrict mobility but are well-suited to guerrilla warfare. Streams flood in spring. At other times the only important water barriers are the Danube, Sava, Tiza, and Drava rivers. In the south and west, streams flow through rugged terrain which handicaps movement more than the streams. One-third of the country is forest-covered, mainly in the highlands. Military movement is easiest from July to October. It is most difficult in the spring because of melting snow, mud, swollen streams, and flooded areas and is next most difficult from October to mid-December because of heavy mid-autumn rains followed by alternate thawing and freezing of the ground. Throughout the winter, movement is slightly more feasible because streams are frozen sufficiently to permit passage of troops and light equipment.

(3) Strategic Areas and Routes - Belgrade is the political capital and commands the entrance to the two chief Balkan routes to the south, one to Istanbul and the other to Salonika. Bor, in north-eastern Serbia, is the largest copper-producing center in Europe. Entrance to the country by routes other than those in the north is difficult because of terrain restrictions but is not impossible. Routes from the south are from Salonika via the Morava-Vardar valleys and from Sofia via Nis; the main route from the west runs from Trieste via Ljubljana to Zagreb.

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b. Transportation and Communications

(1) Transportation

The small portion of Yugoslavia which lies north of the Sava River and includes the broad valleys of the Danube and the Tisza provides part of the main transcontinental land and waterway route between Europe and the Near East. Daily capacity exclusive of the Danube, is estimated at about 7,500 short tons. The Danube is capable of transporting 20 - 30,000 tons daily below Budapest if adequate craft are available. In this area of Yugoslavia, in addition to the principal international rail, highway, and waterway routes, all of which channel through the Belgrade area, there is a fairly dense transportation network serving the industries located there.

Communications through the mountainous terrain between the Sava and the Adriatic Sea are tenuous, sparse, and very limited in capacity. Most of the railways in this area are of narrow gauge, although work is in progress converting some of them to standard gauge.

A very large proportion of the railway system was destroyed during World War II. Rehabilitation and new construction have made some progress, but there is a severe shortage of serviceable locomotives and other rolling stock. The general efficiency of the railroads is not high. A poor standard of engineering, particularly on the so-called Youth Railways, has in many instances necessitated reconstruction. Coal used by locomotives is of poor quality; watering facilities are in many cases inadequate and numbers of cars are held up at gauge transloading points made necessary by the number of different gauges used.

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Apart from the few international highways, roads are of a very low standard. There is a great shortage of serviceable trucks, inadequate stocks of spares, and an absence of repair shops. Roads through the mountains are frequently blocked with snow in winter.

A two-lane paved super-highway between Belgrade and Zagreb was officially opened on 28 July 1950; however, the surface varies from concrete and tarmac to gravel, and the roadbed is already deteriorating due to lack of maintenance.

Of the waterways of strategic significance, the Danube is by far the most important. The Sava is navigable up to Sisak, 30 miles southeast of Zagreb. Most war-damaged river ports have been fully repaired, the principal ports being, in order of importance, Belgrade, Zrenjanin, Beocin, Zemun, Novi Sad, and Bosanski Brod. Traffic is liable to interruption from floating ice between mid-December and early February. The Danube's bottleneck is the Iron Gates Channel above Turnu-Severin (Rumania). At this point, cargoes are transhipped from 2,500-ton river craft into 1,000-ton barges which are normally assisted through the rapids by towing locomotives.

Adequate ports on the Adriatic coast, apart from Trieste which is not in Yugoslavia - have not been developed to handle large tonnages, mainly because communications with industrial areas are lengthy. Only Rijeka (Fiume), Split, and Sibenik are served by standard gauge railways. These combined ports are capable of discharging a total of about 18,000 tons daily, 75 percent of which could be moved over road and rail lines of communication into the Ljubljana-Zagreb area. Other ports, including Dubrovnik, Ploce, and the ports in Kotor Bay, are served by narrow-gauge railways and indifferent roads, and although some 18,000 tons can be discharged through them, only about 2,000 tons could be moved into the Belgrade-Nis area.

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(2) Communications

Yugoslav telecommunications facilities suffered heavy damage during World War II. Since then the facilities have been fully restored, somewhat enlarged, and modernized. Even so, Yugoslavia does not possess more than a limited system of telephone and telegraph lines, a radio communications network mostly for special services, and a fair broadcasting system. The largest portion of traffic is carried on low-capacity overhead lines inland and a multiplicity of short submarine cables between the mainland and the islands along the Adriatic coast. Telegraph traffic constitutes the greatest load, but the traffic capacity of the whole system is small and is severely taxed.

The most important part of the system is the civil telephone and telegraph network.

Only a very small part of the system used underground cables. The main artery is the heavy trunk route which connects Maribor and Ljubljana with Zagreb. On the way from Zagreb to Belgrade, the line crosses the northern plain in a generally eastern direction through Brod and Vinkovci. From Belgrade it runs southward through Nis and Skoplje to Greece. Zagreb and Belgrade are the central points on this route, and from there most secondary lines radiate. A branch from Vinkovci to Sarajevo feeds the part of the system in central Yugoslavia. Skoplje is the main center in the south of the country and has trunk connections to Yugoslavia's ports on the Adriatic.

The KNOJ and the railways, as well as some Ministries and nationalized industries, operate special networks. It is believed that the Yugoslav Army and Navy also have fixed telecommunications facilities of their own, probably sufficient for peacetime traffic. In an emergency, the armed forces would presumably take over the civil system. The combined facilities appear to be more suitable for the

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support of operations against the country's northern than against its southern and eastern neighbors. Large-capacity lines connect Yugoslavia with Trieste and Italy. Connections with Austria consist of a large-capacity underground cable and two lesser lines. The situation in regard to Hungary is less favorable. There are only small-capacity lines connecting Yugoslavia with Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. Coastal facilities have almost exclusively a defensive role for which they appear sufficient.

The international radio communications station is in Belgrade. Radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia appears to be adequate for the country's needs. There are approximately 2 individual receivers for each 100 persons. Wired loudspeakers are operated in public places.

c. Strategic Industrial Potential

(1) Composition - Yugoslavia's strategic industries are relatively weak, with manufacturing concentrated on textiles, shoes, glass, chemicals, wood and paper, and food products. Expansion of heavy industry is provided for in the present Five Year Plan. A few motor vehicles are produced, but capacity for all types of machinery and transportation equipment is insufficient to cover domestic requirements. Production of heavy industrial chemicals predominates in the chemical industry, which lacks coal tar and phosphates. Arms capacity is predominantly for the production of light infantry weapons and ammunition. Facilities are available to make tank parts and limited quantities of light artillery pieces and for the repair of armaments which have been obtained from foreign sources.

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TOP SECRET(2) Efficiency of Labor and Management - The

nationalization of industry, plus police state methods, has tended to destroy enterprise, initiative, and cooperation. Much managerial talent has been lost during and since the war. The economy is now suffering from poor planning and management and from a general shortage of skilled labor owing to the lack of industrial background and skills of the population.

(3) Availability of Raw Materials - Yugoslavia has an

export surplus of lignite but must import anthracite and coking coal. Petroleum production and refinery capacity is small. An export surplus of good-grade iron ore is produced, and fairly large reserves of manganese and chromium are also available. Yugoslavia is relatively rich in non-ferrous metal ores, particularly copper, lead, and bauxite. Supplies of nickel are inadequate, and there is a complete lack of tin and magnesium.

II. ARMED FORCES1. Present Strength and Composition - Present strength of ground

forces is estimated at 360,000 made up of 275,000 * Army, 45,000 KNOJ (security troops), and 40,000 Militia. The Army contains 31 rifle and 2 armored divisions.

2. Dispositions - The strongest concentration (12 rifle and 1

armored divisions) is in eastern and southern Yugoslavia, disposed in areas opposite the Bulgarian and Albanian frontiers. The next largest concentration (8 rifle and 1 armored divisions) is in northern and northwestern Yugoslavia, disposed in the area opposite Hungary and Austria. In addition, six rifle divisions are in northeastern Yugoslavia, opposite Rumania and Hungary. The remaining five rifle divisions are in the interior part of the country and along the Adriatic coast.

* Temporarily augmented by 80,000 conscripts of the 1928 class held over while the new class is being integrated but scheduled for release by the beginning of 1951.

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3. Status of Supply - The Army is well equipped with small arms. It is fairly well equipped with mortars and artillery, except antiaircraft and antitank. It is weak in tanks and motor vehicles. Signal and chemical equipment are definitely scarce. Maintenance of all categories of equipment is hampered by a shortage of spare parts. There are few reserves except of small arms. At present there is no foreign source to replace present stocks. Local production of heavy weapons and ammunition is inadequate to meet the needs of the armed forces.

4. Mobilization Potential - The mobilization capacity for the ground forces is estimated at about 1,200,000 men.

a. Trained reserves	1,600,000 (only partially trained)								
b. Untrained reserves	700,000								
c. Speed of mobilization	<table> <tbody> <tr> <td>M=Day</td> <td>360,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M/30</td> <td>600,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M/180</td> <td>1,000,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M/360</td> <td>1,200,000</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	M=Day	360,000	M/30	600,000	M/180	1,000,000	M/360	1,200,000
M=Day	360,000								
M/30	600,000								
M/180	1,000,000								
M/360	1,200,000								

5. Combat Efficiency

a. Strengths - Skill in mountain and guerrilla warfare gained during World War II. Fairly high degree of training; efficient organization. Ruggedness of individual soldier. Strong sense of nationalism.

b. Weaknesses - Limited ammunition supply. Limited and heterogeneous arms supply. Lack of mechanical skills on the part of most personnel. Inexperience in large-scale modern warfare.

6. Quasi-Military Organizations - KNOJ troops are adequately trained to serve as infantry units. However, KNOJ divisions have no artillery, and it is doubtful that adequate reserve artillery stocks

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exist to convert them into balanced combat units. Furthermore, they would probably be utilized in carrying out their normal security functions. The Militia is a semi-militarized police-type organization.

7. Weapons of Mass Destruction - None.

8. Tactics and Techniques - Based primarily on partisan experience in World War II. Considerable Soviet influence as result of three-year tutelage. Some German influence.

III. STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY

1. Economic - With the exception of coking coal, petroleum, and small quantities of tin and some other metals, Yugoslavia is not dependent upon outside sources to any large degree for materials to maintain her current low rate of economic activity. The economic situation has deteriorated as a result of the 1950 drought and of mismanagement, and foodstuffs must currently be imported.

2. Social-Political - The principal weakness of the Government lies in the anti-Communist attitude of the majority of the people. Their present degree of support for the Government is based on the absence of any practical alternative other than a pro-Moscow regime. Another significant weakness is the presence of ethnic groups which might pursue individual aspirations detrimental to the unity required.

3. Military - Vulnerable Points: Railroad yards at Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Wis, and Vidani Most. Principal ports: Rijeka, Split, Sibenik, Pola. Passes, bridges, and tunnels on railroads leading to these ports. Passes, bridges, and tunnels on railroads leading to Austria, Italy, and Trieste.

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MILITARY CAPABILITIES

1. To Assure Internal Security

- a. Against Sabotage - Yugoslav Armed Forces can prevent large-scale organized sabotage.
- b. Against Riots and Insurrections - The Armed Forces are believed quite adequate against any likely internal uprising.
- c. Against Civil War - The Armed Forces are adequate against civil war.

2. To Defend

- a. Borders and Strategic Areas - The Yugoslav Armed Forces are capable of defending the country against attacks by any one of the neighboring states.
- b. Utilization of Guerrilla Warfare - The Yugoslavs have had extensive experience in guerrilla tactics and organization and could doubtless wage a country-wide guerrilla war against any invader.

3. To Wage Offensive War

- a. Size of Offensive Force - Up to 20 divisions could be committed. More with outside logistical support.
- b. Probable Course of Action - It is highly improbable that Yugoslavia will engage in any offensive action at present. She might participate in a Western counteroffensive if the Soviet threat has been removed or diminished.
- c. Length of Time Offensive Can Be Maintained - In an offensive war the Yugoslavs could probably maintain an offensive for two or three months.

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